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PUBLIC LAW AS THE LAW OF
THE RES PUBLICA
Elisabeth Zoller*
A LECTURE GIVEN AS PART OF SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL
LAW REVIEW'S 2008 DISTINGUISHED SPEAKER
COLLOQUIUM SERIES
In 1989, on the occasion of the Bicentennial of the French
Revolution, I gave a talk at Suffolk University Law School on
The Distinction Between Man and the Citizen in the Declaration
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789.1 In retrospect, I am
afraid that this may not have been one of my best talks. The
truth of the matter is that I failed to give the rationale for this
crucial distinction and its meaning in the Declaration of 1789. I
said that the distinction was almost invisible in this country and
much less important than in the French legal system, but I did
not explain why.
Today, thanks to the research I did to write my most recent
book, Introduction to Public Law: A Comparative Study,2 I am
in a better position to indicate why the distinction between Man
and the Citizen really matters in French law. The reason lies in
the distinction between public law and private law that struc-
tures the French legal system.
What does that mean when it comes to rights? It means
that rights have to be exercised in the context of common values
shared by all citizens, that is, res publica. The stronger the res
publica is, the less absolute rights exist. The res publica in a
polity means that rights are not absolute, that they must be exer-
cised responsibly and may not be abused. In other words, res
* Professor of Public Law, Universit6 Paris II (Panth6on-Assas). This article is
an edited version of a lecture that Professor Zoller presented at Suffolk University
Law School on March 12, 2008 as part of the Suffolk Transnational Law Review's
Distinguished Speaker Colloquium. She was invited to give this lecture on the occa-
sion of the publication of her new book, Introduction to Public Law: A Comparative
Study.
1. Elisabeth Zoller, The Distinction Between Man and the Citizen in the Decla-
ration of 1789: Past Significance and Contemporary Relevance, Address Before Suf-
folk Univeristy Law School (1989), in CELEBRATING HUMAN RIGHTS at 3-12
(Margaret Collins Weitz ed., 1990).
2. ELISABETH ZOLLER, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2008).
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publica implies that rights are not exercised in a state of nature,
but rather in a political association, which we usually call the
State, or a Republic, that is, the community of the permanent
interests of the people.
In saying this, I do not mean that the distinction between
public law and private law is not made in the United States. But
it is not as entrenched as it is in France, and it does not have the
same meaning. First, there are, in the U.S., no public law courts
separate from the judiciary in charge of adjudicating public law
cases, such as France's Conseil d'Etat, the supreme court of the
administrative courts. Second, the content of public law in this
country is not the same as in France. When American lawyers
refer to "public law values," they refer to individual values, such
as due process of law, fairness, legality, the rule of law, and ra-
tionality. In contrast, French public law calls for public-oriented
values, such as missions of public service, burdens of general in-
terest or duties of solidarity.
I have always been puzzled by this difference, all the more
so because the two countries share a common destiny in the
ideal of the republican form of government both embrace. To
make a long story short, I decided to investigate the origins and
evolution of public law, and eventually wrote Introduction to
Public Law to understand why and how public law followed
such different paths in both countries.
My methodology was historical and comparative. I went
back to the origins, Roman law, because Rome is the birthplace
of the distinction between private and public law through the
concept of res publica, and I tried to understand what happened
to that distinction after the collapse of the Roman Empire. I
started, first, in Europe with the Monarchical Age, which is cru-
cial in the history of public law because, during this period, con-
cepts such as sovereignty and the State gave a new twist to the
distinction between private and public law. I then turned to the
fate of that distinction in the Republican Age, after the revolu-
tions of the eighteenth century that took place in this country
and in France. During this presentation, I intend to take you on
the same journey by going back to the legacy of Roman law and
the meaning of the res publica, and then, the fate of that res
publica, first, in the Monarchical Age, and, second, in the Re-
publican Age.
[Vol. 32:1
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THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW
Public law, in the sense first defined by the Romans, is the
law of res publica, literally the public thing, that is, the public
interest or common good, predicated on the differentiation be-
tween the State and the government.
Res publica was created by the Romans to solve problems
arising out of Rome's domination of the Mediterranean Basin.
Rome's urban institutions were modeled after those of the an-
cient cities with a senate and an assembly of citizens that elected
the magistrates. With the legion's conquest, these institutions
became inadequate; they were already out of date when the Re-
public extended its government over the Italian Peninsula. In
order to avoid a return to the Oriental tradition of power per-
sonified in a single man, such as the Egyptian Pharaoh, the Ro-
mans invented the notion of res publica: the goals, the affairs,
institutions that are the thing of the peoples, a sort of property
held in common. The power of the people over their property is
abstract and general. No one possesses or exercises it personally
or exclusively. The foundation of the power is distinct from its
exercise; the res publica belongs to everyone in general and to
no one in particular. Everyone participates in it, but no one has
ownership of it.
Cicero was the first author who defined the public thing as
the thing common to all, the thing of the people, a notion that
eventually evolved into the common good or the public good.
Res publica, res populi. Cicero wrote: "The public thing is the
thing of the people and by the people I mean not just any gath-
ering of people, but a large group of people forming a society
and united by their adherence to a pact of justice and the shar-
ing of common interests."3 (juris consensu et utilitatis commu-
nione sociatus).
This pact of justice and the community of interest born of
the solidarities between men are the two pillars of the public
thing - the thing of the people - which was later viewed as the
common, or public good or the general interest, all of these
terms being different expressions of the res publica. There is no
polity without a "public thing." As Sieyes put it on the eve of
the French revolution: "It is impossible to conceive of a legiti-
mate association whose objects are not common security, com-
3. Cicero, DE IA RtPUBLIQUE 12 (Alfred Fouill6e ed., Delagrave 1868).
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mon liberty, in a word, the res publica (chose publique)."4 The
res publica is what ties the people together; it forms the raison
d'etre of their will to live together, to form a society. Note how
different Cicero was from current modern thinking. He was cer-
tainly no Margaret Thatcher, who once suggested, "There is no
such thing as society. ' '5
The content of the res publica in Rome was well articulated
in the opening statement to the great compilation of Roman
laws that form the Digest:
The law obtains its name from justice; for (as Celsus elegantly says)
law is the art of knowing what is good and just ..... (2) Of this subject
there are two divisions, public and private law. Public law is that
which has reference to the administration of the Roman common-
wealth; private law is that which concerns the interests of individuals;
for there are some things which are useful to the public, and others
which are of benefit to private persons. Public law has reference to
sacred ceremonies and to the duties of priests and magistrates.6
4. EMMANUEL SIEYES, QU'EST-CE QUE LE TIERS ETAT? 205 (Robert Zapperi
ed., Droz 1970) (1789). Siey~s' phrase in French reads as follows : "II est impossible
de concevoir une association 1dgitime qui n'ait pas pour objet la s6curit6 commune, la
libert6 commune, enfin la chose publique." The English translation for "chose pub-
lique" is no easy matter. Id. (literally 'public thing'). Neither "common welfare,"
(translated by Blondel: "It is impossible to imagine a legitimate association whose
object would not be the common security, the common liberty, and, finally, the com-
mon welfare"), nor "public establishment" (translated by Sonenscher: "It is impossi-
ble to conceive of a legitimate association whose objects are not common security,
common liberty, and a public establishment") conveys the real meaning of chose pub-
lique, the French expression for res publica, which Webster's Dictionary, defines as
"the commonwealth, the State." EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYES, WHAT IS THE THIRD
ESTATE? 156-57 (M. Blondel trans., Praeger Publishers 1964); EMMANUEL JOSEPH
SIEYES, POLITICAL WRITINGS INCLUDING THE DEBATE BETWEEN SIEYES AND TOM
PAINE IN 1971 153 (Michael Sonenscher trans., Hackett Publishing 2003); WEBSTER'S
DICTIONARY 1005 (9th ed. 1991). Instead of an impossible translation, I have chosen
to keep the Latin expression as the best word to convey the object of public law.
5. Interview by Douglas Keay with Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister, in
London, England (Sept. 23, 1987) available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/
speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=106689. The exact quotation reads:
I think we have gone through a period when too many children and
people have been given to understand "I have a problem, it is the
Government's job to cope with it!" or "I have a problem, I will go and
get a grant to cope with it!" [or] "I am homeless, the Government
must house me!" and so they are casting their problems on society and
who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and
women and there are families. ... Id.
6. THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN Vol. 1, p. 1 (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Kruger ed.,
Alan Watson trans., 1998).
[Vol. 32:1
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The content of public law in Rome was determined by the
close and intimate connection that existed in the ancient world
between public law and religion. This connection has evolved
over the centuries. It entered into a period of profound trans-
formation with the Reformation in the sixteenth century. The
collapse of the Church and the beginning of the concept of sov-
ereignty paved the way for the emergence of the State, the ab-
stract entity through which modern public law developed.
The res publica involves the general public utility (utilitatis
communione), which brings people together in a society bound
by common objectives (the public good, the general welfare) as
well as by legal bonds (the constitution). The conceptualization
of res publica as distinct from private interests is one of the
greatest legacies of Roman civilization.
What happened to that great concept after the fall of the
Roman Empire? It became a thing of the past. No concept
could be more foreign than res publica to the peoples who in-
vaded Europe. Everything was private to them, including the
territory. Res publica was brought back to life by the Church
through the concept of common good. Later, in the sixteenth
century, res publica became absorbed in the State, which devel-
oped within the matrix of sovereignty. It entered two periods:
first, the Monarchical Age, during which the res publica became
the exclusive concern of one single organ, the monarch, and,
second, the Republican Age, when the res publica became the
responsibility of the people.
THE DESTINY OF THE RES PUBLICA IN THE
MONARCHICAL AGE
In France, the res publica - known by the French as the
State (l'Etat) - is a very meaningful notion; it occupies a place
without any equivalent in foreign legal systems. The State, in
France, is the community of the permanent interests of the na-
tion, not the instrument of domination or coercion that it may
represent elsewhere, in other legal systems. The State is the res
publica, the Republic, and it is surrounded today with the same
respect, even the same devotion, that formerly surrounded the
royal institution. The cognate notions that revolve around it,
such as general interest, public interest, or public utility, reso-
nate throughout the French legal system as constant reminders
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of its structuring principle and pervading spirit; the compelling
submission of private interests to the public thing.
When these concepts affect a private legal situation in a
regular and justified manner - when, in other terms, the Repub-
lic speaks by its laws - private interests must yield, just as they
did in the past when the King spoke by his laws. The French
monarchy has engraved the public thing and its legal institution,
the State, in the "habits of the heart" of the French nation.7
In Germany, the same concern for the public good devel-
oped, although on different foundations. Whereas the State, the
res publica, in France was a thing, it became a person in Ger-
many, through the concept of the Furstenstaat (Prince State).
The concept of the Prince State had a profound influence on
public law. The concept of the personified State was not effec-
tively destroyed until the nineteenth century, and in the twenti-
eth century, it was retained only in a pyramid of norms, as
illustrated by the legal theory of Hans Kelsen.
In England, by contrast, the State did not develop, nor did
the values it is supposed to harbor. The British Monarchy has
never been able to develop a strong sense of the res publica.
When it tried to do so under the Stuart dynasty, it was too late.
The common law had already developed enough so that the pre-
rogative had to submit to it. When it comes to public law, Brit-
ish legal history is crucial to understand the opposition between
England and the continent. There is a tension between the rule
of law and the res publica. The former is not supposed to work
in favor of the latter; both concepts are even regarded as antag-
onistic. The rule of law, as guaranteed by the courts, works pri-
marily in favor of individual rights.
That brings us to the question of whether the judge can
enunciate the public good? The answer is in the affirmative if
the public good is regarded as an aggregation of private rights;
but this is not the republican definition of the public good. The
7. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (Harvey Mansfield
trans. ed., Delba Winthrop trans., 1835). As Alexis de Tocqueville used the expression
"habits of the heart:"
I understand here the expression mours in the sense the ancients at-
tached to the word mores; not only do I apply it to mores properly so-
called, which one could call habits of the heart, but to the different
notions that men possess, to the various opinions that are current in
their midst, and to the sum of ideas which the habits of the minds are
formed.
[Vol. 32:1
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public good does not mean making people happy all the time; it
does not mean the systematic satisfaction. of individual prefer-
ences over collective values. There is an opposition between the
liberal and republican conceptions of the public good. Although
this opposition should have diminished with the passage to the
Republican age, that was not the case. A huge divide took place
between two republican models and the opposition forms the
substance of the second part of my book. Below, I briefly sum-
marize the main theme of my argument on the destiny of res
publica in the United States and in France.
THE DESTINY OF THE RES PUBLICA IN THE REPUBLICAN AGE
What happened to the res publica when it ceased to be the
responsibility of a single organ, a monarch, and became, instead,
the thing of the people? The answer is that two models have
developed since the revolutions of the eighteenth century, the
American model, defending the liberal state, and the French
model, more inclined to the republican model.
As opposed to France, the United States does not seem to
have a strong feeling for the res publica, at least today. Al-
though solemnly enunciated in the Constitution, the Preamble,
the Bill of Rights, and the Civil War Amendments, the values of
the American res publica have become increasingly abstract.
Pure public law values such as a more perfect union, general
welfare, blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, citi-
zenship, equal protection of the law, are now perceived by the
citizenry as formal rather than substantive. Interestingly, these
values do not enable power, they actually disable it. They work
to the benefit of private interest of individuals and they tend to
merge with the rights of man, or individual values, rather than
collective or public values.
Contemporary Americans seem to no longer believe that
all members of the public share the same core interest in a ho-
mogeneous set of interests. This is not the case in France where
the concepts of fraternity and, today especially, solidarity are
constantly reiterated in political programs.
What explains these differences between the two countries?
That is a question that has driven my research. I do not pretend
to have reached definite answers; rather, I have made sugges-
tions. A caveat is in order here: When you embark on a com-
parative project of this sort, you must inevitably paint with a
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broad brush. Details have to be sacrificed in order to unveil
bright lines.
What are these bright lines? The first of them, of course, is
the legacy of Roman law. The easy explanation for the differ-
ences in res publica between France and the United States is
that the former inherited Roman law, whereas the latter did not.
The argument derives from the opposition between common
law and civil law systems. But it is not as strong as it looks. The
weak part of the argument is this: There are some periods in
American history where res publica glows as the shining sun,
periods where the Constitution is not construed as limited to the
protection of certain basic liberties, but instead is interpreted as
having created a representative government capable of translat-
ing the people's will into effective public action. The New Deal
or the Civil Rights eras are cases in point. In many ways Recon-
struction, too, may be an example of a very strong res publica,
but not in its representative form. During this period, the fed-
eral government passed important legislation, dealing with
emancipation, poverty, civil rights, the environment, health and
safety, etc. These periods demonstrate that the res publica can
be very strong in the United States, despite the fact that the
country never formally adopted Roman law.
One must, therefore, look for factors other than the heri-
tage of Roman law to explain the divide between the two repub-
lican models. There are probably multiple factors but when it
comes to a legal analysis, two factors distinguish the starting
points of the U.S. and French revolutions.
When framing the constitution of the polity, the first major
difference between the United States and France is that the two
countries did not solve the problem of representation in the
same way. In large republics, representation is a necessity, but
how should it be organized? Each country has given different
answers, particularly as to the question of whether private inter-
ests are allowed to be represented in the legislature. In the
United States, the answer is in the affirmative, which results in
factions arising within the legislature and the problem of how to
neutralize them. Madison made a brilliant analysis of the prob-
lem in Letter 10 of the Federalist Papers. France, however, took
a different path. Instead of neutralizing factions, it decided
from the beginning that factions would not be admitted in the
legislature. This is what the French theory of national represen-
[Vol. 32:1
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tation means when it makes the deputy, not the representative
of his constituents or constituency, but rather, the representative
of the Nation. The two opposite theories on representation
have important consequences for the law-making process in
each country.
The second major difference is in the means chosen to pro-
tect rights of man. Both republics share similar concern for the
protection of individual rights, but they completely differ on the
best means to protect them. In choosing the statute (Loi) over
the common law to protect their rights, as was the case in the
Monarchical Age, the French abandoned the old medieval tradi-
tion of justice as sovereign expounders of the law. By contrast,
the Americans chose the courts. Here lies the reason American
courts stand fast against legislatures and occasionally venture to
set aside their laws.
In the common law tradition, to which the United States
remains steadfastly faithful, courts are able to rely on a rich leg-
acy of rights and liberties dating from time immemorial. These
ancient rights and liberties have never been abrogated; on the
contrary, all of them were accepted by the legislatures in the
states, and they are still in force when courts decide on their
cases. This wealth of rights and liberties is the common law, and
this common law is the fulcrum that allows the lever of judicial
review to rise so high. As in England, in this country the com-
mon law means that in the legal system there exists a bundle of
rights and freedoms, coming from the depths of history, which
are not part of the social contract but rather are reserved, that
is, protected from legislative encroachments. And the role of
courts is to dig into this endless wealth of rights, as needed, and
remind the legislator of their existence.
In the civil law system, which originates in the principles
laid down by the French Revolution, courts do not have these
resources. There are no reserved rights in this model; there are
just natural rights which have all been put into the social con-
tract and which are all subject to regulation by statutes. The
essential characteristic of the political association comprising the
Nation is that everyone gives himself entirely to it, so that the
conditions are equal for all. As Rousseau put it:
If the individuals retain certain rights, as there would be no common
superior to decide between them and the public, each being on one
point his own judge would ask to be so on all. The state of nature
HeinOnline -- 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 101 2008-2009
102 SUFFOLK TRANSNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
would thus continue and the association would necessarily become
[inoperative] or tyrannical. 8
Under such circumstances, in French law, only a statute
may regulate rights, to the exclusion of a court's opinion. This is
actually what the Declaration of Rights of 1789 precisely pro-
vides for in Article 4: "The exercise of the natural rights of any
man has no other limit than those which guarantee to the other
members of society, the enjoyment of the same rights. These
limits may be defined only by statutory law." (emphasis added).
The idea that a judiciary counterforce in the republic would
regulate, in lieu of the legislature, the boundaries and the con-
tent of the rights and liberties among and between citizens in the
republic, is not a complement, but rather a distortion of the
French Republican model.9
In conclusion, lest I am misunderstood, let me say that, in
my opinion, one model is not better than the other. I am not
interested in choosing. I'm interested in explaining what hap-
pened, why we have ended up with such different models, and
why the divide between Europe and this country seems to be
growing.
My feeling is that the Americans and the French should talk
to each other more often than they do, for, at the end of the day,
both countries share the same values.
8. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, bk. 1, ch.6 (G.F.H. Cole
trans., BN Publishing 2008) (1762).
9. The recent constitutional revision of July 23, 2008, which gave any party to a
case the right to question the constitutionality of a statute, did not modify this princi-
ple in a fundamental way. CONSTITUTION OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC 2008 ammend. 61-1
(Fr.) (to come into effect in the manner determined by statute). The reason is that,
should such a question be raised by a party to a case, the court is powerless to answer
it. The court must stop the proceedings and refer the matter to one of the two su-
preme courts (Cour de cassation or Conseil d'Etat), which are in charge of deciding
whether the question is worth being referred to the Constitutional Council for a ruling
on the merits, but not whether the party is well-founded in questioning the statute.
The crux of this extremely cumbersome procedure is that judges are still precluded
from reviewing statutes themselves and determining the content of rights and liberties
among citizens and between the citizens in a republic.
[Vol. 32:1
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